From the mid-1800s, road building and maintenance in Aotearoa New Zealand was overwhelmingly localised. Provincial authorities originally oversaw these activities between 1854 and 1876, supported by a patchwork of Road Boards that directed everything from choosing where roads should go to fixing ruts after storms. By 1875, there were 314 such boards, each operating with considerable freedom, which led to roads of sharply varying quality across the country. Early routes in many districts followed traditional Māori walking tracks or settler pathways, and upkeep often meant hauling away mud or levelling dirt by hand.

Settlers traversing these roads encountered few signposts—generally just a painted wooden board or handwritten warning. Although efforts were sporadic, local people did grasp that hazards such as washouts or loose gravel demanded a warning to passing riders. In the absence of uniform laws, local customs had an outsized influence on road safety. Some towns had police constables who waved down carts on busy days. Others simply relied on a “roadman” or “flagman” standing by with a red flag during culvert repairs. The practice of walking ahead of a vehicle brandishing a warning signal echoed overseas precedents, including Britain’s “Red Flag” era, and spoke to the improvisational nature of early road safety practices. In Wellington in 1887, one steam-driven road roller was so loud that a worker with a red flag marched in front to alert onlookers—a human barrier in lieu of a traffic sign.

Local reactivity to hazards was typical in communities reliant on horse-drawn traffic. Dust, narrow carriageways, and uneven surfaces compelled travellers to look out for themselves. Road Boards, when able, would lay coarse gravel or install culverts and drainage to keep roads passable. Signage, however, was scant and inconsistent, reflecting the limited central coordination. A rural borough might post a “Caution—Men at Work” plank or wooden barrier, then rely on word-of-mouth if people ignored it.

After 1876, when provincial governments were abolished, central government still hesitated to impose strong uniform regulation. Competition for funding was fierce, and local districts held tight to decision-making about roads. Policemen directing wagons or bullock carts in towns like Christchurch or Dunedin was common during markets or public events. In small rural settlements, farmers or labourers simply put up an improvised barricade or flagged down approaching coaches if a road hazard existed. Despite the patchiness of these arrangements, the methods suited a relatively slow-paced era.

Motor vehicles began appearing in the 1890s, introducing an entirely new dynamic. The McLean Motor-Car Act 1898—a world first in some respects—imposed a speed limit of 12 miles per hour for these novel “horseless carriages”. Such legislation signalled a belated acknowledgement that unregulated motor traffic on local roads posed risks, requiring more than just courtesy and the occasional police whistle. The mere presence of those early cars—few in number, but unfamiliar—exposed the vulnerability of existing road conditions and underscored the inadequacy of ad-hoc traffic controls.

Figure 1: Road construction workers
A group of road construction workers using shovels, picks and a wheel barrow circa 1905-1910. They are refered to as “Turnbull’s Gang” on the back of the file print. Taken by James McAllister, probably in Taranaki.
PA-Group-00406. McAllister, James, 1869-1952 :Negatives of Stratford and Taranaki district. 1896 – 1930. [Collection]
Reference Number: 1/2-C-21078, Alexander Turnbull Library

A notable speed-related incident in 1901, in which a Christchurch man was fined for travelling at 21 km/h on a road with a 6 km/h limit, foreshadowed the debates that would soon arise around consistent, enforced safety measures. Yet by 1900, formal “Temporary Traffic Management” was still decades away. Road maintenance stayed small-scale, signage was homemade, and any sense of structured regulation belonged mostly to city bylaws or police directives.

Figure 2: Road construction, Northland
Northwood Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library

Reference Number: 1/2-067720-F, Alexander Turnbull Library

Local memory and anecdote highlight that an unspoken code guided travellers: slow down near ongoing works, heed the hand signal of a roadman, and avoid galloping a horse-drawn carriage over fresh fill. These customs were shaped by environment and necessity—rarely by official decrees. The system, though inconsistent, generally suited communities with low traffic volumes and speeds. It also fostered a pragmatic acceptance of risk that persisted until the dawn of motorised vehicles and the realisation that workable, standard guidelines were needed.

New ordinances and bylaws proliferated in the early 1900s, shaped by two converging trends: motor vehicles were becoming less of a novelty, and local councils found that ad hoc oversight could no longer cope with rising travel speeds and traffic volumes. By the 1920s, sustained national interest in road oversight took hold. The Main Highways Act 1922 created the Main Highways Board, which extended government funding to key routes linking multiple districts. This Board’s influence marked a pivot away from insular local practices: major roads gained more coherent rules, while smaller roads still had varying local signage and control.

Figure 3: Road construction using horses and a steam roller
Heretaunga Street West, Hastings, photographed ca 1920s-1930s by Henry Norford Whitehead of Hastings. A road sign with ‘Lovedale Road’ is in the background.
PA-Group-00397. Whitehead, Henry Norford, 1870-1965 :Negatives of Napier, Hastings and district. [ca 1920s-1930s]. [Collection]
Reference Number: 1/1-004744-G, Alexander Turnbull Library

Driver licensing, made compulsory in 1925, gave authorities a firmer basis to monitor dangerous conduct around road works, because those who flouted local rules risked losing licences. Enforcement also became more consistent with the formation of the Transport Department in 1929, unifying fragmented responsibilities for vehicle registration and traffic policing. Combined, these changes diminished purely local experimentation with makeshift boards or unapproved warning notices. Instead, regulation took on national scope, backed by police who would caution or fine contractors if they did not install and maintain proper notices near road repairs or closures.

By the mid-1930s, uniform signage and road safety education became pressing matters. The first Road Code in 1936 explained traffic fundamentals that drivers were expected to follow, including what to do when confronted with “MEN AT WORK” boards or closures. Histories of this period note that wide disparities remained at local levels, where councils often re-used or crudely painted old boards for construction zones. Nonetheless, the Road Code and broader awareness campaigns fostered a climate less tolerant of haphazard signs that misled or offered scant protection for workers on busy roads.

Economic strains in the later 1930s and wartime exigencies in the 1940s further illustrated the importance of well-managed roads. Vital supply corridors could not afford major disruptions or chaotic controls around work sites. Construction crews patching potholes after floods or upgrading bridges had to factor in heavier vehicles, limited rubber for tyres, and restricted fuel supplies—conditions that raised the stakes for both traffic flow and safety. The National Road Safety Council, established in 1936, joined local authorities in encouraging basic but standardised barricades, symbolic caution signs, and better lighting for night works. This evolution brought TTM closer to an organised discipline, at least on primary roads and in larger towns.

Figure 4: Roadworks by Bitumix, Queen Street, Auckland
Roadworks by the firm Bitumix on Queen Street, Auckland, circa 1950s. Retail outlet Milne & Choyce is in the background. Photographer unidentified.
PAColl-6388. New Zealand Free Lance original photographic prints, from the file print collection, Box 5. New Zealand Free Lance : Photographic prints and negatives (PA-Group-00079). [Item] Reference Number: PAColl-6388-62, Alexander Turnbull Library

Reflective materials made a tentative début toward the end of World War II, though cost and supply issues limited them mainly to critical warning signs. As the war wound down, the Main Highways Board, Transport Department, and other bodies looked to overseas practices for new ideas, prompted by growing car ownership and the promise of higher-speed roads. They acknowledged that piecemeal local rules could jeopardise national consistency, an early sign of the standardised manuals soon to come.

By 1950, TTM in New Zealand was no longer just the job of a local policeman with a whistle or a handy placard. It was on the brink of a more centralised, professionally managed phase, driven by institutional oversight, evolving legislation, and increased traffic that demanded reliable methods of warning and protection on roads in flux.

New Zealand’s drive towards modern roads accelerated in 1950 with the opening of its first motorway—an experimental three-mile stretch north of Wellington designed to channel higher-speed traffic and showcase emerging standards of roadway design (NZTA.GOVT.NZ). Within months, the government mandated the country’s first compulsory STOP signs, signalling a shift away from ad hoc warnings. From that point on, key intersections and other high-risk sites increasingly featured official, clearly recognisable signs rather than hand-lettered boards or leftover relics from earlier decades.

Although basic safety practices had been evolving since the 1930s, the appearance of this motorway triggered fresh scrutiny of how to protect road workers and motorists. Crews labouring on the new route encountered more cars travelling faster than ever before. Councils and the National Roads Board concluded that guiding vehicles around hazards demanded a cohesive approach, not just improvised closures. By mid-decade, new regulations underscored this shift. In 1956, drivers had to slow to 10 mph if they passed a school bus picking up or dropping off children, one of the first rules specifically invoking the idea of a “temporary” work or hazard zone. Not long after, 1957 brought the nationwide introduction of “Give Way” signs at troublesome intersections, again foreshadowing the structured approach that would eventually surface in TTM’s dedicated codes.

Figure 5: Auckland City Council Traffic Department float, 1958. Auckland Libraries Heritage Collections (Record ID: 580-03595). Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY).

For roading authorities, the motorway served as a live testbed. Crews setting out lane-closure boards on this faster corridor discovered that signs needed to be heavier so they would not topple in the slipstream of passing vehicles. Local councils close to the motorway also began marking smaller on-ramps and off-ramps with portable barriers, painted bright white or vivid yellow for visibility. These interventions, although still rudimentary, offered glimpses of a more intentional, scientifically anchored system—one that took note of driver behaviour at higher speeds and emphasised placing warning devices at consistent heights and intervals.

Debates about funding did not wait long to surface. Even at this relatively early stage, establishing properly lit advance-warning signs, arrow boards, or speed-limit postings was a cost that some highway planners viewed warily. Neil Lonsdale’s cartoon from around 1960 encapsulates these tensions. Under instructions for the National Roads Board to trim its budget, a supervisor is depicted advising the road crew, “Just take it steady, that’s all!” (Alexander Turnbull Library, Ref: A-310-143).

Figure 6: Lonsdale, Neil, 1907–1989: The Government wants the National Roads Board to cut its spending this year by up to £2 million as part of the general policy of economic restraint [newsclipping]. “Just take it steady, that’s all!” [ca 1960]. [Original cartoons by Neil Lonsdale from 1957 to 1968]. Ref: A-310-143. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand.

Although humorous in tone, the cartoon speaks volumes about the discontent that arises whenever investments in road and worker safety appear “too much.” As the next two decades would reveal, this tug-of-war between implementing best-practice controls and minimising expense would dog TTM well into the modern era.

Despite these frictions, the National Roads Board (established in 1954) stood firm on the principle that safer, more uniform roads benefited the entire country. Slowly, local councils conformed, painting consistently shaped temporary signs and standardising temporary speed reductions when undertaking routine maintenance. By the close of the 1950s, the motorway concept had ignited interest in more systematic controls for detours, lane closures, and road-shoulder repairs. No one called it Temporary Traffic Management just yet, but a national appetite for coherent, well-enforced traffic control had begun to take root, sparking the developments of the 1960s and beyond.

Rising demand for better roads in the 1960s prompted a nationwide surge in motorway and highway construction. The Ministry of Works, long the dominant force in major infrastructure, took charge of upgrading key routes. The National Roads Board (NRB) helped direct the funding and oversight needed to streamline efforts, but local councils still dealt with a fair share of maintenance. By 1961, traffic engineering had become recognised as a major new discipline in New Zealand, signalling that vehicles were travelling faster and more frequently, and that complex urban networks demanded professionals to manage everything from intersection controls to the planning of future corridors (Douglass, 2003). New suburban growth in cities like Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch introduced the realities of higher-speed roads in built-up areas, requiring fresh thinking about safety at worksites. Basic “MEN AT WORK” boards and occasional cones no longer sufficed around substantial roading upgrades and motorway interchanges.

Practical demands soon pushed the NRB, local councils, and industry groups to pursue greater systematisation of roadworks signage and layouts. By the mid-1960s, the first version of the Manual of Traffic Signs and Markings was released. It laid down standardised sign formats for all New Zealand roads, including temporary signage. This represented a big step, as MOTSAM established coherent rules about sign dimensions, colours, placement distances, and reflectivity. Although not exclusively devoted to temporary traffic management, it provided a bedrock that roading agencies could apply to worksites—no longer did each local authority rely on custom-painted boards or improvised messages. By the late 1960s, the NRB coordinated periodic updates to MOTSAM’s temporary traffic elements, influenced by experiences from busy motorways in Auckland and vital freight corridors in regions such as Waikato.

Growth in high-speed routes also drove new practices. Auckland’s Southern Motorway project, started in the 1950s, ramped up significantly in the 1960s, with further motorway connections added across the region (Douglass, 2003). These jobs frequently kept lanes open so traffic could still flow, forcing contractors to develop traffic control methods that balanced safety with throughput. Crews adopted reflective cones more systematically and used large arrow boards—essentially trailer-mounted signals—to direct lane shifts. Early experiments with these methods, which had been observed in the United States and the United Kingdom, were adapted to local conditions, especially for night works. In practice, this meant trial and error. Some sign trailers were prone to tipping in high winds; certain reflective cone varieties deteriorated in harsh sunlight. Still, each iteration of these devices refined the growing knowledge of worksite safety.

Engineers and planners within the Ministry of Works and NRB increasingly looked beyond local practice, taking cues from international traffic safety research. Yet guidelines remained limited. MOTSAM gave general instructions, but formal “Traffic Management Plans” (TMPs)—the coordinated plans that detail specific layouts, sequences, and equipment—were only beginning to appear in the 1970s. Large projects sometimes drafted site-specific traffic control diagrams, but these were not mandated by uniform nationwide rules. They functioned more as recommended best practice on bigger works, whereas smaller jobs often still relied on improvised measures and the good sense of site supervisors.

As speeds and traffic volumes mounted, road contractors faced real hazards. Basic high-visibility jackets began to appear among maintenance crews, especially at night. Barricades evolved from wooden saw-horses to metal frames with flashing beacons, though these were not universally used. Although the underlying legal framework still did not call it “Temporary Traffic Management,” the seeds were being planted for an organised discipline. Insurance claims and police concerns over collisions near worksites also drew sharper scrutiny, encouraging local authorities to require more careful signage and partial closures. Technological innovations like brighter paints and retroreflective sheeting offered a glimpse of how a science-driven approach might one day supersede local improvisation.

Growing interest in methodical solutions led the Ministry of Works to strengthen its research capacity. The Road Research Unit, overseen by the NRB and housed within the Ministry, gathered data on driver behaviour and signage visibility in various conditions. Studies examined the merits of narrower lane widths, coning patterns, and temporary speed reductions near roadworks, laying a foundation for more comprehensive standards. A trickle of Australian and American guidelines began to reach local engineers, accelerating the introduction of standard traffic control layouts for lane diversions or one-way alternations on rural roads.

By 1980, while the term “temporary traffic management” was still not in common use, the country had seen enough success with standardised signage, pilot traffic control devices, and partial traffic management plans to grasp that something more formal was imminent. The stage was set for a concerted effort to raise consistency and authority across all roadworks, paving the way for the more structured specifications and prescriptive guidelines that dominated the next chapter of TTM evolution.

New Zealand’s rapid roading expansion of the 1960s and 1970s had rested heavily on the Ministry of Works (Ministry of Works and Development from 1974), which maintained powerful central control over major road projects. By the early 1980s, that dominance began to wane, culminating in the Ministry’s abolition by legislation in 1988 and complete closure in 1993. Its functions and assets moved into a residual management unit before ultimately transferring to newly created, state-owned (and eventually privatised) entities such as Opus and Downer EDI Works Ltd.

For those working on roads, the dissolution ushered in a more decentralised environment. Public-sector crews who once reported through a single, unified hierarchy were scattered. Private contractors—often formed from the old regional offices—took over day-to-day maintenance and construction. The tight operational cohesion that had defined Ministry of Works’ large-scale projects gave way to a growing patchwork of approaches, particularly visible in how temporary traffic arrangements were handled.

In parallel, the newly formed Transit New Zealand (separated from the National Roads Board in 1989) introduced contract-style specifications to ensure safer and more uniform practices on state highways. One such specification was the G/1 Specification for Temporary Traffic Control, published in the early 1990s. G/1 was narrower than today’s codes, focusing on the contract obligations of crews working for Transit NZ. It described the signage and layout that contractors had to provide at worksites in order to be paid. This commercial enforcement mechanism offered a powerful incentive for compliance but lacked practical details for crews. Practitioners remember it as a short administrative guide, often appended to large maintenance contracts, which included references to “standard signs” or “approved cones” without prescribing exact usage in every scenario. In many respects, it relied on local knowledge to fill in the blanks.

Police frustration with uncoordinated works rose sharply in the early 1990s, especially on higher-speed corridors around Auckland and Wellington. Occasional fiascos occurred, like one infamous instance on State Highway 16 in Auckland where line-markers and shoulder repairs overlapped in an unplanned lane squeeze. As recounted by one individual ‘The Police rang us, absolutely furious. They had motorists pinned between two closures and no safe way through’.

This prompted the appointment of a newly-created function for Auckland’s motorways – a Traffic Management Coordinator (TMC)—an individual empowered to demand that contractors confer on scheduling and layout before shutting lanes. The TMC role had appeared in Ministry of Works projects during the late 1970s on an ad-hoc basis but became more formalised as the newly autonomous Transit sought to placate Police concerns. By the early 1990s, local TMCs had also been introduced in Wellington, although their duties varied from region to region. A TMC in one area might be deeply involved in approving multi-lane closures, while in another they were little more than a paperwork reviewer.

Contractors adapting to these changes sometimes felt the tension between older, minimalist methods and costlier new measures. Equipment like reflective cones, trailer-mounted arrow boards, and portable barriers were relatively expensive on smaller contracts. Yet the shift to more “modern” devices picked up pace after the Ministry of Works dissolved. Companies keen to prove their professional capabilities found that adopting advanced gear helped them stand out in an increasingly competitive market. Others, wary of eroding their profit margins, argued that G/1 and WOTR did not explicitly require such devices on every job, so they stuck with simpler setups.

Local inspectors might still see an open-sided barrier or a single “Men Working” sign in front of a pothole repair. Such bare-bones traffic control often went unnoticed on low-volume roads unless a serious incident brought scrutiny. That made the early 1990s a period of stark contrast: some projects boasted carefully planned lane shifts and well-placed signs, while others relied on pre-1980s improvisations. Certain progressive contractors cultivated in-house training, aware that minor errors in coning or signage could invalidate contract claims. Others left staff to learn by trial and error on job sites.

These transitional years set the stage for more unified standards. Observers within Transit, the Police, and private contracting circles increasingly saw that patchwork guidelines allowed basic errors—like adjacent lane closures— to persist. No single document or mandatory training regime pinned together the newfound, post–Ministry of Works workforce. Even as motorway networks expanded and contractors gained commercial freedom, the next logical step—a national, integrated TTM approach—was still on the horizon. By the mid-1990s, as police pressure continued and public expectations of professional roadworks increased, momentum for a unified code grew stronger, paving the way for the High Capacity Highways (HCH) era that took root soon thereafter.

The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSE Act) started shaping industry thinking almost immediately upon its enactment about accountability and risk. Transit Auckland built certain HSE Act references into motorway contracts, emphasising that substandard TTM could breach legal obligations beyond contract conditions.

Concurrently. Auckland’s growing motorway network highlighted significant shortcomings in the existing temporary traffic management (TTM) tools available in New Zealand. The Working on the Road (WOTR) handbook and Transit’s G/1 Specification were sufficient for moderate-speed environments but faltered on multi-lane, high-velocity corridors. At Transit Auckland, Jon Lewando led the move toward a dedicated motorway standard (in part in response to the HSE Act). This initiative materialised as High Capacity Highways (HCH) in 1995. It introduced detailed coning plans, mandatory arrow boards, and recommended truck-mounted attenuators (TMAs)—some had been trialled in 1988 on the Auckland Harbour Bridge but were not widely used.

One of the drivers in the development of HCH was the recognition of international uniformity (standardised signs and the following of international conventions (UK chapter 8, etc.). There was also an increasing awareness of the impact on international tourist drivers who were used to and expected these international standards. This philosophy is applied equally to permanent traffic management facilities.

In the construction of HCH, there was a deliberate intention to look internationally and introduce more prescriptive standards because of the increasingly contractually mature engagements (and the need for national and international consistency). More frequent attempts to not comply through adept and not-so-adept “contractual wriggling” (generally due to financial considerations not just on the part of contractors but also their clients) were being observed.

In places, there was also a genuine interest in more structure – particularly from practitioners. Understandably, they wanted to know “what they had to do in clear terms and be left to get on with it”. Thus, the TMP, not the Code (HCH as it emerged), was the critical document on a site-by-site basis, as it remains today.

Prescription for TTM in NZ, by way of the HCH, had its first foothold. However, this was not unwarranted, as recounted by contributors to this article. Prescription has its place – it gives order, structure and consistency. It affords practitioners some certainty in treating risks and makes provisioning TTM faster end-to-end. The drivers that led to the introduction of HCH were valid and remain valid today. Despite how prescription may creep further and broader than intended, prescription holds a crucial place in risk management across various sectors – the least of which is TTM. As NZ transitions towards a less prescriptive framework, it is essential to remember the importance of prescription and where it adds value to safety outcomes – ‘with’ or ‘without’ prescription should not be a binary choice.

The newly introduced HCH standard included a two-day training course culminating in a 50-question test, making it the first locally enforced warrant for TTM. Although the training was only theoretical at this stage, HCH dramatically altered how workers perceived their responsibility for safe closures. The experiences with this initiat HCH theory course would eventually inform CoPTTM’s national training system, which retained a 60% pass mark from HCH—an attempt to accommodate field-focused workers who could manage physical setups despite weaker test-taking skills.

Though HCH was prescriptive, the compulsory training element aligned with the HSE Act’s call for workplaces to adopt fit-for-purpose safety measures. Contractors in Auckland reacted differently. Some viewed HCH as an expensive excess. Others, notably Fulton Hogan, embraced the system early, sending multiple staff through the training and amassing a core of HCH-qualified supervisors. This positioned them favourably when Transit Auckland embedded HCH requirements into motorway maintenance contracts.

HCH’s original training approach only tested theory. In 1996, Fulton Hogan sought a more practical assessment approach to provide greater validity of competency. This was initiated with NZTA and with the use of two assessors, the “practicing” ticket was born, This qualification was made compulsory as part of the revised HCH version in 1997 for Auckland and Wellington.

Outside Auckland and Wellington, overall TTM performance lagged. In 1998, a G/1 trainer lodged a formal complaint with Transfund, questioning the deteriorating quality of state-highway worksites. Dr Ian Appleton of Transfund directed nationwide audits, enlisting John Boyson, Jeff Kaye, and Stuart Fraser to inspect real-world closures. They found significant deficiencies. The resulting roadshows exploring the audit results revealed widespread agreement that training was inconsistent, guidance was patchy, and budgets often inadequate. Transfund put direct pressure on Transit New Zealand to “sort it out”.

Work on what would become the Code of Practice for Temporary Traffic Management (CoPTTM) started in late 1998. Transit NZ’s Dennis Davis managed its development, with Jeff Kaye (Opus) doing substantial drafting. HCH’s emphasis on enhanced layouts, robust training, and the on-site supervisor role was carried over, but there was a desire to ensure the final code did not look like an “Auckland-only fix.”

A working group, including representatives from Traffinz, contributed feedback. They wrote a letter warning that a rigid “one size fits all” model might not suit lower-volume roads.

By late 1999, draft chapters were being refined, though some local authorities (notably in the Bay of Plenty) questioned how new requirements would be funded if introduced mid-contract. Nonetheless, Transit was determined to consolidate WOTR, G/1, and HCH into a single national document. In only eighteen months, CoPTTM moved from concept to reality. Published on 7 June 2000, it effectively folded HCH’s motorway-derived standards into a nationwide framework. Auckland’s approach to training warrants, more prescriptive practices, and the TMC function were scaled to fit other regions. This laid the groundwork for the next phase, which would see CoPTTM gradually adopted nationwide, ushering in an era of increasingly prescriptive TTM.

Over four editions—2000, 2002, 2004, and 2011—the CoPTTM became increasingly prescriptive, culminating in seven significant amendments by 2016. Originally, CoPTTM was revolutionary in consolidating existing standards—G/1, the Code for High Capacity Highways, and the WOTR handbook. However, transitioning to this national standard was slow. By October 2002, only 20% of Road Controlling Authorities (RCAs) had adopted CoPTTM exclusively.

The CoPTTM’s introduction was an evolutionary moment, and this was deliberate. Transit NZ was well aware of the risk of variations mid-contract; thus, CoPTTM was required for all new contracts on State Highways after the application date. It was also available for existing contracts if the parties so chose. Local Authorities, over whom Transit had no direct control, were encouraged to follow the same path. The majority took an alternate pathway – the Local Road Supplement (LRS).

The LRS became a highly influential document. It came out as a local authority response to the CoPTTM at roughly the same time. Transit NZ resisted this alternative initially. However, eventually there was recognition and finally (with some reluctance) acceptance. It would take until 2010/2011 for the LRS path and the CoPTTM to converge and harmonise.

The introduction of the CoPTTM took time and was a significant undertaking. New equipment had to be manufactured and supplied, and introducing a national harmonised training system required many more trainers to be trained. This all took time.

That CoPTTM qualification system, introduced in July 2000, began certifying individuals to manage TTM. Between 2011 and 2020, the number of qualified individuals grew from around 25,000 to over 57,000, with approximately 10,000 people entering the system annually. This centralised training system reinforced the prescriptive nature of CoPTTM, as employers leaned on certification as evidence of competency, though the qualification system was predominantly theory-based with minimal practical components.

Figure 11: Progression of CoPTTM Qualifications in NZ (2000 – 2020)

The prescriptive approach became deeply entrenched as employers relied on the national qualification system as evidence of compliance, confusing certification with actual competency—a responsibility that had been enshrined in legislation since the Construction Act 1959 (Section 9), reinforced by the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (Section 13), and reaffirmed under HSWA (Section 36, 3(f)). Despite these enduring legislative expectations, there was a growing reliance on prescriptive, centralised ‘license to operate’ training rather than adhering to the well-established duty for employers to ensure genuine competency and safety.

The HSWA further complicated this tension. HSWA introduced performance-based duties of care, obligations for risk management, and a stronger focus on the hierarchy of controls, significantly expanding the scope of employer responsibility. The 2016 amendments to CoPTTM sought to massage its prescriptive framework into compliance with HSWA by maintaining its granular structure while superficially integrating risk-based language. This allowed practitioners to follow rigid instructions, inadvertently undermining HSWA’s push for dynamic risk management. Though CoPTTM incorporated HSWA’s broader philosophy, the amendments did not reduce reliance on compliance-focused practices. The retention of prescriptive rules perpetuated a culture of rule-following rather than risk management.

CoPTTM’s final substantive update in 2018, followed by minor amendments in 2020, ballooned the document to 567 pages with 1450 instances of “must”. The prevalence of this word exemplifies the expanding scope of prescriptive instruction within TTM. WorkSafe NZ reserves “must” for legally binding obligations, yet CoPTTM, which is not legally enforceable, relied heavily on this language.

Table 1: Comparison of progressive TTM standard documentation in NZ – 1977 – 2023

Note on the above table: G/1 and the WOTR were used in tandem, making their length more ‘combined’ when considering progressive standards. Likewise, HCH was a motorway-centric document (which WOTR was not) – so it could be considered that the HCH, G/1 and WOTR combined are an appropriate early comparison to CoPTTM’s 

Analysis of the progression from the 1977 manual to the final 2020 CoPTTM reveals a dramatic increase in length—from 37 pages and nine instances of “must” to over 560 pages and 1450 instances of “must”. Between CoPTTM editions three (2004) and four (2020), the number of prescriptive “must” instances rose by over 176%, reflecting a snowballing proliferation of obligatory instruction.

Despite this, the legal system saw limited testing of these standards. An analysis of WorkSafe NZ’s court summaries (2013–2024) and historic health and safety cases from NZLII and LexisNexis databases identified only 23 TTM-related legal cases since 1993. These cases were categorised by the relevance of TTM to the case, as determined by the court sentencing notes as follows:

Table 1: Comparison of progressive TTM standard documentation in NZ – 1977 – 2023

These cases implicated 28 parties, with 75% of those being the primary contractor. Eight of the 23 were proactive prosecutions (no reported harm). All bar two (acquittals) resulted in either a conviction or an enforceable undertaking. The prevalence of TTM-related legal cases mildly intensified after the enactment of the HSWA, with 13 parties charged under that legislation between 2016 and 2023, compared to only 15 under the preceding HSE 1992 Act across 22 years.

Table 1: Comparison of progressive TTM standard documentation in NZ – 1977 – 2023

The general lack of case law on TTM failures masks the potential shortcomings of relying solely on prescriptive standards. While performance-based legislation promotes comprehensive risk management, prescriptive standards—if followed in isolation—can diverge from these principles. In NZ, the absence of legal rulings that expose this mismatch fosters the misconception that prescriptive compliance is fully protective. Without legal challenges demonstrating that following prescriptive rules may be inadequate or legally risky, those with safety duties are not forced to confront their limitations. This lack of legal consequences possibly contributed to the rise of prescriptive standards, as standard setters (NZTA and RCAs) may have viewed them as the only means to drive performance improvements without visible court action.

In February 2019, one of NZ’s deadliest incidents for TTM workers occurred when three traffic control workers were killed adjacent to a high-speed state highway in Matata, Bay of Plenty. This tragic event became a critical catalyst, prompting NZTA to scrutinise its regulatory role and the broader TTM framework. The incident triggered an NZTA investigation into the effectiveness of its TTM regulation.

NZTA’s response was almost immediate. In April 2019, the agency issued an interim notice to the CoPTTM, mandating a 50km/h temporary speed limit when work occurred within 2 metres of a high-speed state highway. This reaction bypassed the dynamic risk assessment principles encouraged by HSWA, reinforcing a rigid and granular approach to TTM that emphasised strict compliance over context-specific risk management.

In parallel, NZTA expanded its framework by significantly overhauling the Training and Competency system. Replacing the qualification system established under CoPTTM Edition 1, this new system focused on practical assessment, competency-based evidence, and partnership with the Construction and Infrastructure Industry Training Organisation (ITO), Connexis and the NZ Qualifications Authority (NZQA). By April 2021, this revised system became fully operational, emphasising centralised, structured training to standardise further TTM practices across NZ. One of the qualifications arising from this overhaul was the TTM Planner (TTMP) qualification. Initially met with little interest, the TTMP became a core qualification by 2020, becoming mandatory on 31 December 2020. This qualification marked an increasing reliance on formalised competency frameworks, adding another layer of prescription to the system.

The ramifications of the Matata triple fatality culminated in 2020 with Higgins Contractors’ conviction under HSWA, where the sentencing highlighted several critical failures in their traffic management practices. The court noted that Higgins had failed to conduct a site-specific hazard identification or risk assessment before work began—a fundamental requirement of the HSWA. CoPTTM’s contents often create an illusion of safety by encouraging compliance over context-specific risk management. In this case, the prescriptive framework obscured the need for dynamic risk assessments that align with on-site hazards. The belief that following CoPTTM guidelines equates to meeting legal obligations under HSWA highlights a dangerous disconnect—CoPTTM’s prescriptive measures are not a substitute for the core principle of risk management enshrined in legislation. This case is a clear example of the absence of risk management as a fundamental mechanism for ensuring safety. Despite decades of increasing prescription, the fundamental failure in this case was the absence of proper risk management.

Concurrently, NZTA launched a comprehensive review of CoPTTM in May 2020, forming a Stakeholder Review Group to strengthen the prescriptive framework. Initially, the aim was to amplify CoPTTM’s precision and substance, but in December 2019, Austroads published Australia’s first harmonised national TTM standard, including a risk management section. This document laid the foundation for integrating ISO31000-based risk processes into Australia’s TTM framework and significantly influenced NZTA’s thinking. By 2024, Australia had largely harmonised its TTM standards, taking a balanced approach that prioritised risk-based decision-making and then applying prescriptive measures – ensuring that prescription supported the process rather than replacing it.

In yet another parallel dimension of TTM reform, work zone safety performance came under heightened scrutiny, focusing on reducing deaths and serious injuries (DSIs)—arguably the most ethical and foundational outcome being sought. Despite two decades of increasingly prescriptive measures, TTM-related DSIs in New Zealand continued to rise, underscoring the persistent gap between compliance and real-world safety. The growing prescription layers failed to deliver meaningful reductions in DSI rates, revealing the limitations of CoPTTM’s compliance-driven framework.

In November 2020, NZTA announced its intent to transition to a risk-based TTM approach, taking inspiration from Austroads’ Guide to TTM. However, it was not until December 2021 that NZTA commissioned a research report titled Research to Support the Application of a Risk-Based Approach to Temporary Traffic Management. Despite its title, the report did not make conclusive recommendations about the definitive application of a risk-based approach. Instead, it provided insights into existing processes, such as using a 60-second tool for site evaluation designed to incorporate real-time risk assessments based on site-specific conditions. This tool and the research failed to align TTM practice with the risk-based philosophy. While the report underscored the importance of integrating worker safety into all phases of road-related projects, the philosophical question of how to support a genuinely risk-based approach remained principally unaddressed. This highlights the pre-determined nature of the doctrine shift, as the research was commissioned after the transition was already well underway. The report was not delivered until May 2023, one month after the draft NZGTTM was published for consultation in April 2023.

By October 2021, NZTA’s strategic communication shifted, and they formally announced the transition from the prescriptive CoPTTM to the NZGTTM. The NZGTTM moved towards a principle-based, risk-oriented framework, breaking away from decades of rigid compliance-based practices. NZTA’s Board had briefly noted the CoPTTM review in its December 2021 meeting, but the publicly available minutes offered little detail on specific progress or strategic direction. The next mention came in February 2024, when the board noted the NZGTTM’s implementation and emphasised its desire for proactive innovation and planning.

In March 2022, the first draft of the NZGTTM was published for public consultation, followed by a feedback period that drew over 1,200 submissions. The feedback, released in August 2022, reflected the deep-rooted, prescription-centric mindset of an industry long reliant on CoPTTM’s rigid frameworks. Stakeholders, accustomed to detailed prescriptive guidance, saw the absence of such detail in the NZGTTM as a potential regression. This lack of prescription was perceived as a backward step that could lead to inconsistent TTM practices and a possible deterioration in desired safety outcomes. Concerns were also raised about the financial impact of the transition, the training needs it would impose, and the effects on pricing and competition, particularly for smaller contractors.

NZTA committed to publishing the NZGTTM alongside WorkSafe’s Keeping Healthy and Safe While Working on the Road and Roadside regulator guidance in August 2022. However, this commitment was not upheld. Select contractors conducted trials of NZGTTM principles over the summer of 2022/2023.

By April 2023, the NZGTTM was formally published, definitively reducing the prescriptive TTM doctrine cultivated over the previous 50 years in NZ.

The NZGTTM, with only 87 instances of the word “must” compared to CoPTTM’s 1,450, signalled a profound shift in NZ’s TTM standards. This reduction in prescriptive measures exemplified the philosophical shift from rigid compliance to flexible, risk-based decision-making. NZTA signalled its intention to adopt the NZGTTM’s risk-based approach for its activities and state highways while showing indifference toward local council adoption. This amplified concerns raised by ACE about potential jurisdictional discrepancies in TTM standards, leading to confusion and reduced productivity for contractors working across roading authority boundaries (ACE, 2022).

The sector responded. In October 2022, a TTM Credentials Framework Working Group was formed, followed by a TTM Industry Steering Group (TTM ISG) in April 2023. These groups addressed the operational shifts brought by the NZGTTM, preparing the industry for the transition from prescriptive standards to a risk-based framework. Initially, NZTA planned to retire CoPTTM by 2025, allowing time for an orderly shift. However, following the 2023 parliamentary elections, public scrutiny over rising TTM costs accelerated this timeline significantly.

Discussion regarding prescriptive systems, being ‘risk-based’ or the philosophy underpinning how TTM is performed, is an entirely different subject to the spend on TTM. Those subjects, however, have recently become conflated to be in response to and seeking the same outcome. They do not, and are not (but that are inextricably connected). 

Elected officials, especially in Auckland, turned their attention to TTM costs, which received extensive media coverage throughout 2024. This public and political pressure crystallised when the Government Policy Statement on Transport (GPS) was released in August 2024. For the first time, this document explicitly outlined TTM cost-saving expectations. As a result, NZTA announced in August 2024 that CoPTTM would be retired earlier than planned, in October 2024, with a complete transition to NZGTTM for capital works and maintenance contracts by mid-2025. The intensified focus on fiscal efficiency post-election amplified the urgency of this transition. The cost-saving focus overshadowed earlier intentions for a gradual shift, forcing an expedited adoption of risk-based TTM, framed as a response to economic pressures.

By September 2024, the roadmap for NZTA’s transition to the risk-based NZGTTM was fully established, with the centralised TTM training system—previously housing over 57,000 active qualifications—scheduled for retirement on 1 November 2024. The shift to a new NZ Qualifications Authority (NZQA) framework had been planned as a modular transition over several years, allowing industry stakeholders to adjust gradually. Instead, this system relies on leaner workplace credentials aligned with NZQA, which were less granular than the outgoing NZTA system.

The transition acceleration was compounded by the uniform adoption of NZGTTM and risk-based principles in all NZTA contracts from 1 October 2024, despite the generalised lack of comfort, understanding, competency and appetite across the sector. Local councils, many of whom had expressed dissatisfaction with rising TTM costs and inefficiencies, also began shaping their adoption of the NZGTTM to maintain alignment with state highway practices. The sharp shift towards expedited adoption reflected the pressures of meeting political, financial, and operational demands, overriding previous intentions for a more measured transition. The CoPTTM, NZ’s long-serving and foundational TTM standard, was formally retired on 1^st November 2024.

The progression of TTM in NZ reflects a multi-decade entrenchment of prescriptive systems, gradually expanding from the 1970s through the 2000s with increasing specificity and granularity. This prescriptive approach culminated in the CoPTTM framework, which by 2020 had become the backbone of TTM operations.

However, in just 29 months, from November 2020 to April 2023, the NZTA pivoted away from this decades-long approach, reshaping the future of TTM in NZ to be risk-based.

This rapid transition – from the conception of the NZGTTM to its publication, trialling, and sector consultation – marked a complete philosophical realignment, condensing what had taken decades to build into a swift and decisive overhaul.

The shift was driven by clear evidence of systemic failure. Despite progressively more detailed prescriptive rules, TTM-related harm was worsening, with 2019 witnessing the deadliest road worksite incident in NZ’s history. Higher profile legal consequences did eventuate, further validating what the courts had telegraphed as early as 1998 – that adherence to a prescriptive standard did not equate to compliance with legislative safety obligations.

The introduction of the NZGTTM aimed to correct these failures, aligning TTM more closely with health and safety laws that had remained broadly consistent for over 30 years. However, as sector feedback in 2022 revealed, significant resistance was rooted in a deep reliance on prescription. Despite this, political and economic pressures beginning in 2024 seek acceleration of the transition, forcing the sector – long entrenched in compliance-based practices – into a rapid adoption of risk-based TTM, leaving minimal time for adaptation.